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Abstract
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable
allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has has several notable structural
properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that
they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches
the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory
and a representation theorem obtained here.
Keywords : Stable Matching, Competitive Equilibrium, Market Design, NTU Assignment
Game, Roommate Problem, Coalition Formation, Bargaining Set, Bilateral Transaction, Gallai
Edmonds Decomposition
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Introduction

Matching models in economics mostly have a two-sided structure, e.g., workers and firms, buyers
and sellers. In this paper we study Pairing Games or Pairing Markets where an arbitrary set of
players partition into pairs and singletons. Each pair of players has a continuum of activities to
jointly choose from if they form a pair - call it a partnership or a bilateral transaction. We are
interested in outcomes that are stable or in competitive equilibrium and in designing a procedure
to achieve them.
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Our model is a generalization of the assignment game (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) in two ways.
First, players are not a priori partitioned into two sides. Second, utility realizations permit income
effects and are not restricted to the quasilinear, i.e., transferable utility (TU) domain.
The assignment game has been very fruitful in modelling a wide range of economic situations,
e.g., markets with indivisibles, marriage, fair allocations, principal-agent matching.1 An important
property of the assignment game is the existence and coincidence of pairwise stable and competitive
equilibrium allocations. Also, two sidedness has permitted the design of rather simple coordinated
market procedures2 for attaining desired outcomes, and the results carry over to more general cases.
For example, players’ preferences may belong to the general nontransferable utility domain3 , players
on one side may have multiple partners if preferences satisfy gross substitutability4 , and players on
both sides may have multiple partners if preferences are additive separable.5
Yet many markets are not two-sided : For example many mergers occur among firms that are
alike. Likewise, acquisitions and joint ventures.6 Various swap markets are example to the multiple
partners version of our model.7 So are organized markets for bilateral contracting in electricity
where some players are seller to one partner and buyer to another.8 It is only recently on the other
hand that Pairing Games and Markets are being explored.9
One reason why non-two-sided models have not been much considered is the possible nonexistence of stable or competitive equilibrium allocations. This possibility is not uncommon. For
example, in the three-player game where two players may share a cake and none of the cakes is sufficiently large in comparison to the other two cakes, the odd-man-out will be able to lure away one
of the partners in any pair that forms. So there is no stable allocation or equilibrium in partnership
prices.
In this paper we offer a comprehensive analysis for pairing games. We use elementary tools
from graph theory and and a representation theorem that we obtain here. We address Existence
1

As in Beckmann and Koopmans (1957), Becker (1973), Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991), Dam and Perez-

Castrillo (2006) respectively.
2
The multi-item auctions in Crawford and Knoer (1981), Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986), Perez-Castrillo
and Sotomayor (2002).
3
Alkan (1989,1992,1997), Alkan and Gale (1990).
4
Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and Stachetti (2000), Milgrom (2009).
5
Sotomayor (1992,2009).
6
Gong et al (2007) report that most joint ventures especially those succesful are bilateral.
7
Our main results in this paper would carry over to the multiple partners model under additive separability.
8
As in the Free Contract Market ACL in Brazil.
9
This is in contrast to the discrete counterpart of our model, the roommate problem (Gale and Shapley (1962)),
which has a fairly substantial literature including the interesting application for kidney exchange - e..g., Irving (1985),
Tan (1990,1991), Diamantoudi, Miyagawa and Xue (2004), Inarra, Larrea and Molis (2008), Klaus, Klijn and Walzl
(2011), and Roth, Sonmez and Unver (2005).
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of Solutions, Structural Properties, Bargaining Aspects, and Procedure Design. The reason for
including all in one paper is the common underlying mathematics.
One of our interests is to address what may happen when stable allocations do not exist. To this
end, we first consider half-partnerships and allow a player to have two half-partners as an alternative
to having one full partner. We call an allocation with no blocking pair stable if only full-partnerships
can form and semistable if both full-partnerships and half-partnerships can form. We then show
that there is an Equilibrium Set always nonempty (Theorem 1) and that this set is the set of stable
allocations or the set of semistable allocations (Theorem 2.) Stable and semistable allocations are
competitive equilibrium allocations when players’ utilities are interpreted as partnership prices.
The structural properties of the Equilibrium Set do not depend on whether it consists of stable or
semistable allocations. The reason for this is that the variable part of the Equilibrium Set is always
associated with full-partnerships (Proposition 2.) Then, on the TU domain, the players under fullpartnership endogenously partition into two sides (Proposition 3) ; hence, the Equilibrium Set of a
pairing game is essentially identical to the Equilibrium Set of an assignment game, in particular, it
has a lattice structure and admits a median allocation. This may be somewhat surprising but, not
surprisingly, is not true on the NTU domain. We also show that the Equilibrium Set has a median
property and is a virtually convex set (Propositions 4 and 5.)
Then we consider what would happen if stable allocations do not exist and half-partnerships
are not viable. Specifically we look at Bargaining Set allocations where no player joins a blocking
pair if she sees disadvantageous counterblocking. Interestingly the Equilibrium Set enters the scene
again. We show that each payoff vector in the Equilibrium Set generates a set of maximumstable allocations (Proposition 6) and a particular subset of these - which we call pseudostable - is
contained in the Demand Bargaining Set10 (Theorem 3.) While they pertain to different institutional
environments, semistable and pseudostable allocations are closely related. To illustrate, in the threeplayer game, the allocation where each player is half-partner to the other two players and the cakes
are shared “equally” is semistable. And each of the three allocations where two players share the
cake “equally” and the third player gets nothing is pseudostable.11
Another important part of our work is the Market Procedure for reaching the Equilibrium Set.
It is a non-two-sided and NTU generalization of the Demange Gale Sotomayor (1986) auction. The
NTU aspect is based on the key lemma behind Theorem 1. The non-two-sidedness aspect utilizes 10

Introduced for TU games by Morelli and Montero (2003) as a refinement of the Zhou Bargaining Set (Zhou

(1994)).
11
The three-player game was taken up by Binmore (1985) for a study of bargaining with pair formation. The
three-player game is of course special. Binmore remarked that “the four-player game is less easily dealt with” citing
“combinatorial difficulties intrinsic to the problem.”
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one of our main results in the paper - the representation theorem (Theorem 5) already mentioned.
We present the Market Procedure at two levels. We first show that it reaches the Equilibrium
Set in a bounded number of steps (Theorem 4.) Then we spell out (in Appendix D) how the
computations can be done recursively at each step. Thus the dynamics are specified at a basic level
and respect computational efficacy.
In addition to our main results summarized above, we show that stable allocations exist when
there are an even number of players in each type (Proposition 1). This result generalizes to the NTU
domain the main result of Chiappori, Galichon and Salanie (2012). We also give a characterization
of the Demand Bargaining Set for pairing games (Proposition 7.)
The organization of the paper is as follows : In the first subsection below, we review the existing
literature on pairing games and point out our contributions ; in the second subsection, we give
an analytical overview and describe Theorem 5. Section 2 gives our model and basic definitions.
Sections 3 to 6 contain the results mentioned above. Appendix A presents the mathematical tools
we use and Theorem 5. Appendix B contains proofs for Sections 3 and 4. Appendix C is an
addendum to Section 5 and Appendix D to Section 6.

1.1

Current Literature and Summary of Contributions

The existing literature on pairing games or markets consists of a small number of papers and they
are all on the TU domain. The earliest one is by Eriksson and Karlander (2001) ; they give a
characterization for stable allocations - at a given matching - that is similar to the characterization
for roommate problems by Tan (1991) and then use linear programming duality for optimal matchings. Talman and Yang (2011) also give a characterization that uses linear programming duality.
Sotomayor (2005) has a characterization that is based on “simple outcomes” and is self-contained
but of a nonconstructive nature. Our Theorems 1 and 2 generalize these results by offering a complementary solution concept - semistable allocations - for when stable allocations do not exist and
by covering the NTU domain. Our approach is self-contained and constructive.
Chiappori, Galichon and Salanie (2012), as already mentioned, consider games with player types
and show that stable allocations exist for populations with an even number of players in each type.
We infer this result for the NTU domain from our Theorems 1 and 2.
More recently, Biro et al (2012) have given an algorithm that finds a stable allocation via
satisfying blocking pairs, but not in a genuine sense, as it makes use of a preconceived target
stable allocation, and Andersson et al (2013) a market procedure that finds a stable allocation via equal-surplus-division allocations at overdemanded sets - without, however, addressing bounded
convergence.
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Our Market Procedure is a genuine procedure that converges in a (polynomially) bounded
number of steps and is on the NTU domain (Theorem 4.) It has moreover a recursive basic-level
specification through the Algorithm we describe in Appendix D.
Our results on the properties of the Equilibrium Set (Propositions 2 to 6) are entirely new.
So is the Bargaining Set analysis we offer, in particular, our result (Theorem 3) on the stability
of pseudostable allocations - a solution concept introduced here - and the characterization of the
Demand Bargaining Set for pairing games (Proposition 7.)
As one of the major contributions of our paper, lastly, we mention our “demand analysis” and
the representation theorem (Theorem 5) in the Mathematical Section in Appendix A. These we
describe in the subsection below.

1.2

The Analytical Aspect

We make no interpersonal comparison of utility : We work with aspirations that are payoff vectors
which assign a maximum-utility to each player that she can achieve given the maximum-utilities of
other players.12 These utilities can be seen as prices that players ask for entering into partnership.
At an aspiration, a player may find herself indifferent among a number of players for forming a
partnership, thus have a non-singleton demand set. We typically deal with aspirations where many
players have non-singleton demands sets.
At an aspiration, we look for demand-compatible matchings that leave a minimum number of
active players unmatched - “active” meaning “above reservation utility”. We call these matchings
active-minimum.
Aspirations are of two types : At any aspiration, either there is a subset of players that partition
into two sides, with an excess of (say) “buyers” over “sellers”, in which case we say there is a
seller-market - a definition we introduce here13 - or there is no such subset of players. We call an
aspiration of the latter type balanced. If it is possible to match all active players at a balanced
aspiration then that aspiration is a stable allocation. Otherwise it is a semistable allocation. The
Equilibrium Set is the set of all balanced aspirations.
The Market Procedure starts from any aspiration, traces a path of aspirations with sellermarkets, and eventually reaches a balanced aspiration. It is fundamental - in this Procedure as
well as in all our basic results - what properties seller-markets have, in particular, how they can
be identified. A relevant fact here is that union of seller-markets need not be a seller-market. But
there are unitary seller-markets - that we introduce - and their union is a seller-market. We define
12
13

Aspirations in cooperative games go back to Cross (1967), Albers (1974), Bennett (1983).
That is closely related to the definition of an overdemanded set in Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986).
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the union of all unitary seller-markets to be the Seller-Market at an aspiration which coincides with
the minimum-size maximum-excess seller-market. The Market Procedure is a Seller-Market tracing
procedure that minimizes excess.
Our main result (Theorem 5) in the Mathematical Section says that the Seller-Market can
be identified by a particular class of matchings. These are active-minimum matchings where the
number of active unmatched players who do not belong to an odd-cycle with three or more players
- therefore stand “solitary” - is minimum. We call them solitary-minimum matchings.14
Theorem 5 gives a representation for Seller-Markets via solitary-minimum matchings. We exploit
this fact in designing the Market Procedure as well as in getting other essential results. The recursive
Seller-Market Algorithm in Appendix D, for example, involves a judicious selection of successive
solitary-minimum matchings along the Procedure Path. In particular, it is on the basis of Theorem
5 that we are able to specify the Market Procedure at a basic level and - a separate matter - prove
that it converges in a bounded number of steps. As another example, our results on semistable
allocations and pseudostable allocations use the fact that a balanced aspiration that is not a stable
allocation admits a solitary-null matching.

2

Model and Basic Definitions

A pairing game is a triplet (N, r, f ) where N is a finite set of players, the vector r = (ri ) gives the
stand alone utilities of players, and the array f = (fij ) consists of partnership functions for pairs of
players : fij (uj ) is the utility ui which i achieves as partner of j when j achieves the utility uj . In
particular
fij = fji−1 .
We assume fij are continuous decreasing functions and fij (rj ) < ∞. In the special class of TU or
quasilinear games, ui = fij (uj ) = cij − uj and cij = cji .
14

Active-minimum matchings are essentially maximum-cardinality matchings and our work is closely related to

the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem (1963,1964,1965) although we nowhere use it explicitly. This Theorem
says that, in any graph, players partition into three types - let us say, “independent”, “central”, “substitutable” such that (i) every maximum-cardinality matching pairs an independent player with an independent player, a central
player with a substitutable player, and leaves unmatched only a subset of the substitutable players, and that (ii) each
unmatched player resides in an odd-cycle defined with respect to the matching. An odd-cycle may be a singleton.
(In the Gallai Edmonds Theorem there is no distinction of active vs nonactive players : A solitary player is an active
singleton player.) We do not know whether singleton-minimum matchings have been utilized.
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ui

fij
fki
uj
fjk

uk

Figure 1: Partnership Functions

2.1

Stable Allocations

A payoff is a vector u ∈ RN that assigns a utility to each player. A pair ij is said to block a payoff
u if there exists (u0i , u0j ) > (ui , uj ) satisfying u0i = fij (u0j ). A payoff is stable if it cannot be blocked
by any pair. We throughout restrict attention to individually rational payoffs u ≥ r.
A matching is a set of pairs where each player is in at most one pair. Given a matching µ, a
payoff u ≥ r is realizable by µ if
ui = fij (uj ) for ij ∈ µ
and ui = ri for i unmatched. An allocation is a payoff that is realizable by some matching. We
also give an allocation u in the form (u, µ) when u is realizable by µ. A stable allocation is a stable
payoff that is an allocation.
An aspiration is a stable payoff u that is individually feasible in the sense that ui = ri or
ui = fij (uj ) for some j for every i. An aspiration is equivalently a payoff u where ui is


max ri , max fij (uj ) ,
j

namely, the maximum-utility that player i can achieve, through some partnership or by standing
alone, given all the other maximum-utilities.15
Remark 1 The aspiration utility of a player may be seen as her individually feasible price for
entering into partnership. A pairing game then is equivalently a pairing market where a competitive
15

One can construct an aspiration in |N | simple steps : Order the players in any way and let Nk be the

top k players in that order.

Let u1 be the stand alone utility r1 of the first player and step by step let

uk = max {rk , maxj∈Nk fij (uj )} for the remaining players.
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equilibrium allocation is a list of prices or an aspiration that is realizable. Thus stable allocation,
competitive equilibrium allocation and realizable aspiration are equivalent.
We let r = 0 with no loss of generality and regard (N, f ) as describing a pairing game or market
fixed in the rest of the paper.

2.2

Demand at Aspirations and Seller-Markets

Let u be an aspiration. Define Di (u) = {j|ui = fij (uj )}. We say i demands j ∈ Di (u) and call
Di (u) the demand set of i. The set of all pairs ij who demand each other, D(u), is the demand
graph. For S ⊂ N , DS (u) = {ij ∈ D(u)|i ∈ S}.
A matching
µ ⊂ D(u)
is said to be demand-compatible or a matching at u. A player set S ⊂ N is matchable into T ⊂ N
if there is a demand-compatible matching µ such that, for every i ∈ S, there is a pair ij ∈ µ with
j ∈ T.
A player i is active if ui > 0 and nonactive if ui = 0. Note that u is realizable - hence, a stable
allocation - if and only if the set of all active players is matchable into N .
We call a pair of player sets (B, S) a submarket at u if
(i) B consists of active players,
(ii) the demand set of every B-player is in S, and
(iii) S is matchable into B.
By (iii), the excess |B| − |S| is nonnegative.
Our interest is in bipartite submarkets (B, S) where B ∩ S is empty.16 We refer to B-players
and S-players as buyers and sellers respectively.
Definition 1 A seller-market at u is a bipartite submarket with positive excess and a balancedmarket is a bipartite submarket with zero excess.
If there is a seller-market at u, we say that u has a seller-market or that u is an aspiration with
a seller-market. It is clear that if u has a seller-market then u is not a stable allocation. As we will
show, on the other hand, a seller-market at u points the way to an aspiration with no seller-market.
Let us consider the three-player games to illustrate our basic definitions :
16

Note that a bipartite submarket is not exactly a “two-sided buyers-and-sellers” market because a seller may

demand a seller.
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Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Consider the TU games where fij (uj ) = cij − uj and say cij = 1 for
every i, j. Take any aspiration u = (u1 , u2 , u3 ). There are two cases. Case 1: ui = 1/2 for every i.
Then Di (u) = N −i for every i and there is no submarket, in particular, N is not matchable into N .
Case 2: wlog u1 = min {u1 , u2 , u3 } and u1 < 1/2. Then u2 = u3 > 1/2, D1 (u) = {2, 3} , D2 (u) =
D3 (u) = {1} and u has the seller-market (B = {2, 3} , S = {1}). No stable allocation exists.
In general wlog c12 = 1, c13 ≤ 1, c23 ≤ 1. It is straightforward to show that, when player 3 is
”small” in the sense that c13 + c23 ≤ 1, there are aspirations where player 3 is nonactive and any
such aspiration is a stable allocation. When c13 +c23 > 1, on the other hand, (Case 1) Di (u) = N −i
for every i at the aspiration u = (u1 , u2 , u3 ) = 1/2(1 + c13 − c23 , 1 − c13 + c23 , −1 + c13 + c23 ), (Case
2) every aspiration u0 6= u has a seller market, therefore no stable allocation exists. The same goes
for NTU three-player games as well.

2.3

An Extension : Half-Partnerships and Semistable Allocations

Stable or competitive equilibrium allocations do not necessarily exist as in Example 1. Here we give
an extension of our model where they exist and are equivalent.
The extension is in the notion of an allocation or realizability : We allow a player to have two
half-partners as an alternative to one full-partner, understanding that half-partnership is reciprocal,
namely, a player i is half-partner to j if and only if j is half-partner to i. We actually assume that a
pair of players i, j can achieve the “half-partnership utilities” (vij , vji ) = (hij (vji ), hji (vii )) through
the “half-partnership functions” hij that satisfy
hij (z) = fij (2z)/2 for all z
(constant-returns-to-scale) and that the utility of a player with two half-partners is the sum of
her half-partnership utilities (separability.) Under these assumptions, when |Di (u)| ≥ 2, a player
i is indifferent between any player in Di (u) as a full-partner and any two players in Di (u) as
half-partners.
We will show that if there is no stable allocation then there is a “stable” allocation where every
player has one full-partner, two half-partners or no partner. In three-player games for instance,
when there is no stable allocation, there is an aspiration where Di (u) = N − i for each player i, and
each player fulfils her demand by having the other two players as half-partners.
Formally, a half-matching χ is a set of pairs where each player in χ belongs to two pairs, in
other words, has two distinct half-partners. Let us note that any half-matching is a disjoint union
of cycles where each half-partnerhip in a cycle shares one player with each of its two neighbors in
the cycle. A semi-matching is a pair (µ, χ) where µ is a matching, χ is a nonempty half-matching
and µ, χ have no player in common.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2014
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A payoff u ≥ r is realizable by a semi-matching (µ, χ) if there is an array (vij ) of half-partnership
utilities such that
ui = fij (uj ) for ij ∈ µ,
ui = hij (vji ) + hij 0 (vj 0 i ) for ij, ij 0 ∈ χ,
and ui = 0 otherwise. An allocation now is a payoff u that is realizable by a matching or by a
semi-matching.
Definition 2 We call a stable payoff semistable if it is realizable by a semi-matching but not
realizable by a matching.
Let us note that a semistable allocation u is a competitive equilibrium allocation where ui is the
price of player i for full-partnership and ui /2 for half-partnership.
Remark 2 By our definition, a matching is not a semi-matching and a stable allocation not a
semistable allocation. On the other hand, a payoff may be realizable both by a matching and by
a semi-matching : For example, in a four-player game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and an aspiration u
where Di (u) = {(i − 1) mod N, (i + 1) mod N }, u is realizable by the half-matching {12, 23, 34, 41}
- a cycle of even cardinality, namely, an even-cycle - as well as by the matching {12, 34}. In general,
if u is an aspiration that is realizable by a semi-matching (µ, χ) and η is any even-cycle in χ, then
there is a demand-compatible matching ν that covers the η-players, so that u is realizable by the
semi-matching (µ ∪ ν, χ − η). In particular, a semistable allocation is always realizable by a semimatching that contains odd-cycles only. In Section 4, we make use of ”essential” semi-matchings
that contain a minimum number of odd-cycles.

3

Existence of Stable and Semistable Allocations : The
Equilibrium Set

We call an aspiration that has no seller-market a balanced aspiration. Our first theorem says that
there always exists a balanced aspiration. Let U be the set of all balanced aspirations.
Theorem 1 U is nonempty.
The proof of this result is of a constructive nature, based on the Direction Lemma which says
that, an aspiration with a bipartite submarket (B, S) can be altered to an aspiration with higher
S-utilities and lower B-utilities at which (B, S) is still a bipartite submarket.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper911
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We state here a key lemma that is the analog of the Decomposition Lemma in the two-sided
matching literature. For any two aspirations u, u0 , consider the disjoint player sets
+
−
0
0
Nuu
0 = {i|ui > ui }, Nuu0 = {i|ui < ui }.
−
Note Nu+0 u = Nuu
0.
+
−
0
Lemma 1 (Nuu
0 , Nuu0 ) is a balanced-market at u for every u, u ∈ U .

Our second main result says that a balanced aspiration is a stable allocation or a semistable
allocation. More precisely :
Theorem 2 U is the set of all stable allocations or the set of all semistable allocations.
We call a matching at an aspiration active-minimum if the number of active players it leaves
unmatched is minimum among all matchings at that aspiration. The underlying fact behind Theorem 2 is that, at any balanced aspiration, there is an active-minimum matching with the following
odd-cycle property : every active unmatched player i belongs to a distinct cycle - with at least
three players - in which every player demands her two neighbors and every player other than i is
matched to a neighbor. So any balanced aspiration that is not realizable by a matching is realizable
by a semi-matching. The proof then follows from the fact (based on Lemma 1) that if a balanced
aspiration is not realizable by a matching then no balanced aspiration is.
Let us recall that aspiration utilities can be seen as prices and stable or semistable allocations as
competitive equilibrium allocations. We call U the Equilibrium Set. In the next section we consider
the structural properties of U . Below we give a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable
allocation.
Players i and i0 are of the same type if
fij = fi0 j
for all j other than i, i0 .17
Proposition 1 U is the set of all stable allocations if there are an even number of players in each
type.
17

This condition allows fii0 to be any partnership function for i, i0 of the same type. If there are more than two

players in their type, however, it is easy to show that fii0 is neccessarily “symmetric” with respect to equal utility
realization.
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Our demonstration is based on the fact that, when there are an even number of players in each
type, a balanced aspiration cannot admit any odd-cycle of half-partnerships, therefore, cannot be
a semistable allocation.18
Remark 3 It is easily seen that, if there is an even number of players in each type, then there
is a stable allocation where same-type players have same-utility. This is not true at every stable
allocation, though, as is evident upon considering a two-player game. If there is an even number
but more than two players in each type, however, it is easily shown that same-type players have
same-utility at every stable allocation.

4

Structural Properties of the Equilibrium Set

In this section we look at situations where the Equilibrium Set U is not a singleton and consider
its structural properties. As pointed out in Example 1, U is a singleton for three-player games that
admit a semistable allocation, and as another example, U is a singleton for four-player games that
admit a stable allocation where each player demands each of the other players. In general though
U is not a singleton. Our first result below shows that the structural properties of U do not depend
on whether U consists of stable or semistable allocations.

4.1

The Variable Set and Stable Bipartitions : TU vs NTU

Given a half-matching χ, let o(χ) be the number of cycles in χ. Let u be a semistable allocation
and (u, µ, χ) a realization of u. We say that (u, µ, χ) is essential if o(χ) ≤ o(χ0 ) for every realization
(u, µ0 , χ0 ) of u.
Let us call a player in X = {i ∈ N |ui = u0i for all u, u0 ∈ U } a constant player and a player in
Y = N − X a nonconstant player. We show below that any player who has a half-partner at some
essential semistable allocation is necessarily a constant player, more generally, that a nonconstant
player is always full-partner with a nonconstant player.
For any matching µ and player set S, let µ(S) = {j|ij ∈ µ, i ∈ S}.
Proposition 2 µ(Y ) = Y at every stable allocation (u, µ) and µ(Y ) = Y at every essential
semistable allocation (u, µ, χ).
18

Proposition 1 can be gotten in two other ways : One involves the fact that the stable allocations of a two-fold

pairing market coincide with the stable allocations of the two-sided market which has one copy of each type. The
other way is to set up a similar equivalence in our extended model with half-partnerships.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper911

12

12

Alkan and Tuncay: Pairing Games and Markets

Let us call V = {uY |u ∈ U } - the projection of U to Y - the Variable Equilibrium Set. Proposition 2 says that payoffs in V are realizable (only) by matchings in Y × Y .19,20 For further insight,
we ask whether Y partitions into two sides anywhere in V :
We say that (i) (Y1 , Y2 ) is a stable bipartition at v ∈ V if Y = Y1 ∪ Y2 , Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅ and
µ(Y1 ) = Y2
for every matching µ by which v is realized, and that (ii) (Y1 , Y2 ) is a stable bipartition over V if
(Y1 , Y2 ) is a stable partition at every v in V .
Our finding is that, while a stable bipartition exists in general at every v ∈ V (see Lemma 11),
a stable partition over V exists for TU but not necessarily for NTU games.
Proposition 3 Let (N, f ) be a TU game. (i) If some v ∈ V is realizable by a matching µ, then
every v ∈ V is realizable by µ. (ii) There is a stable bipartition over V .
This result says that, on the TU domain, V has essentially the same properties as the Equilibrium
Set of a TU assignment game. In particular, with respect to a stable partition (Y1 , Y2 ) of the
nonconstant player set Y ,21 V has a lattice structure and a Y1 -optimal allocation that is Y2 -pessimal.
Moreover, with reference to Schwarz and Yenmez (2011), we can conclude that V - therefore U has a unique median allocation.
Below is a heterogenously linear game where there is no stable bipartition over V = U .
Example 2 There are six players in N = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. The partnership functions are
ui = fij (uj ) = cij − qij uj
where the pair (cij , qij ) is equal to
(15, 2) for ij ∈ {12, 23, 31} and (15/2, 1/2) for ij ∈ {21, 32, 13}
19

Recall the players labelled independent in the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem (Footnote 14.) Every

nonconstant player is an independent player except possibly at u on the boundary of U .
20
It is worthwhile to add the following observation : Consider the game restricted to constant players, i.e., (X, f ).
It is easily seen that the Equilibrium Set of (X, f ) is identical to UX = {uX |u ∈ U }. The Equilibrium Set of (Y, f )
on the other hand is in general a superset of UY = V . For example, when N = {1,2,3} and the worth of a pair is
3 for {1,2} and 1 otherwise, U = {x, 3 − x, 0} where 1 ≤ x ≤ 2. Y = {1,2} and the Equilibrium set of (Y, f ) is
{x, 3 − x} where 0 ≤ x ≤ 3.
21
It is clear that there is a unique stable bipartition over V unless V is a ”product” : In general, let V 1 × ... × V K
k

be the factorization of V where Y 1 ∪ ... ∪ Y K is the finest partition of Y such that (i) V k ⊂ RY and (ii) if ij ∈ DY (u)
for some u ∈ U then i, j ∈ Y k for some k. Then there is a unique stable bipartition over each V k .
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(30, 10) for ij ∈ {46,65,54} and (3, 1/10) for ij ∈ {64, 56, 45}
(10, 1) for ij ∈ {14, 41, 25, 52, 36, 63}
and (0, 0) otherwise. It is straightforward to check that the demand graphs at the three allocations
u = [7, 9, 3, 3, 2, 10], u0 = [3, 7, 9, 10, 3, 2], u00 = [9, 3, 7, 2, 10, 3]
are
D(u) = {(14),(23),(56)}, D(u0 ) = {(13),(25), (46)}, D(u00 ) = {(12), (45), (36)}
respectively (see Figure 2) and that each allocation is realizable by a unique matching. It is easily
seen that N has no partition to two sides such that each of these matchings matches one side to the
other.

4

5

6

4

5

6

4

5

6

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

(b) D(u0 )

(a) D(u)

(c) D(u00 )

Figure 2: Example 2

4.2

Median Property and Virtual Convexity


Let K = uk

be any finite collection of payoff vectors. Let m = |K| /2 for |K| even and m =

(|K| + 1)/2 for |K| odd. For every player i, let Ki be any nondecreasing ordering of uki . Let u∗i

be the mth payoff in Ki , namely, the median of Ki for |K| odd and the lower median of Ki for |K|
∗
∗∗
even. Let u∗∗
i = ui for |K| odd and ui be the m + 1st payoff or upper median of Ki for |K| even.

We define
med {Ki } = [u∗i , u∗∗
i ]

and say that U has the median property if, for every finite collection K = uk with uk ∈ U , there
is a u ∈ U with ui ∈ med {Ki } for every i.
Proposition 4 U has the median property.
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Proposition 4 is a generalization to pairing games of the median property Schwarz and Yenmez
(2011) have shown for TU assignment games and of the median property Eriksson and Karlander
(2001) have shown for TU pairing games when |K| = 3.22
Clearly U is a closed bounded set. Our next result says that U is akin to a convex set. Say that
a vector z is between two vectors z, z 0 if
z i ∈ (min {zi , zi0 } , max {zi , zi0 })
in case zi 6= zi0 and z i = zi = zi0 otherwise. Call any set Z in RN virtually convex if for every z, z 0
in Z there is a z ∈ Z that is between z, z 0 .
Proposition 5 U is a virtually convex set.
It can be shown that a virtually convex set is equivalently a set Z such that (i) any pair z, z 0 in
Z can be connected by a continuous “monotone” path in Z or (ii) any z not in Z can be separated
from Z by an orthant. See Alkan and Gale (1990). It is a straightforward conclusion that U is a
convex polyhedral set when the partnership functions fij are linear.

5

Pseudostable Allocations

In this section we consider what may happen in a pairing game when no stable allocation exists
and half-partnerships are not viable.
This question has been taken up in the context of the roommate problem by Tan (1990) who offered maximum stable matchings as a solution concept, namely, the matchings that leave a minimum
number of players unmatched and are stable when the unmatched players are excluded.23 Below we
first introduce the analogous concept of maximum-stable allocations and show that every balanced
aspiration generates a set of maximum-stable allocations. There are, however, non-balanced aspirations that generate maximum-stable allocations as well. Our primary interest in this section is to
introduce pseudostable allocations - a further refinement of maximum-stable allocations - as a solution concept for pairing games. Our main result (Theorem 3) shows that pseudostable allocations
have a bargaining-set stability property.
22

For even collections K, Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) show the stronger result that U contains the upper median

and the lower median of K.
23
See Inarra, Larrea and Molis (2008) for another soultion concept.
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5.1

Maximum-Stable Allocations and Balanced-Aspiration-Allocations

For any payoff z and T ⊂ N , let zT = (zi )i∈T . For any allocation (v, µ) and T ⊇ µ(N ), consider the
“restricted” game (T, f ) and note that (vT , µ) is an allocation for (T, f ); in particular vi = 0 for i
in T − µ(N ).
We say that an allocation (v, µ) is restricted-stable if there is a player set T ⊇ µ(N ) such that
(vT , µ) is a stable allocation in (T, f ). Given a restricted-stable allocation (v, µ), let T ∗ be the
largest T ⊇ µ(N ) such that (vT , µ) is stable in (T, f ) and call the players in N − T ∗ the outcasts of
(v, µ).
Definition 3 A maximum-stable allocation is a restricted-stable allocation with a minimum number
of outcasts.
For any payoff z and matching µ, we denote z µ the payoff where
ziµ = zi for i ∈ µ(N ) and ziµ = 0 for i ∈
/ µ(N ).
Definition 4 An aspiration-allocation is an allocation (v, µ) such that v = uµ for an aspiration u.
A straighforward observation, which we state without proof, is that an allocation is restrictedstable if and only if it is an aspiration-allocation. We call an aspiration-allocation uµ balanced if u
is balanced and maximum if µ is active-minimum.
Proposition 6 Every maximum balanced-aspiration-allocation is maximum-stable.
Remark 4 When no stable allocation exists, there exist - a plethora of - maximum-stable allocations
that are not balanced-aspiration-allocations : This may be seen by considering any aspiration u =
(u1 , u2 , u3 ) in a three-player game where each player is active and demand is {12, 13}. Clearly
(u1 , u2 , 0) is a maximum-stable allocation and u is not balanced. This shows that maximum-stability
may have less appeal as a solution concept for pairing games than for roommate problems.

5.2

Pseudostable Allocations and Bargaining Set Stability

Recall that a three-player pairing game with no stable allocation has a unique balanced aspiration
u = (u1 , u2 , u3 ) and so - the null allocation (0, 0, 0) aside - the balanced-aspiration-allocations
(u1 , u2 , 0), (u1 , 0, u3 ), (0, u2 , u3 ).
Binmore (1985) showed that (u1 , u2 , u3 ) is the only mutually consistent endogenous outside-option
vector - when any two players may bargain and the outside player is a potential partner in case
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper911
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they cannot agree - and argued that the three allocations above is the “stable set” of the game.24
Another argument to support this view is the following two-step farsighted stability or Bargaining
Set argument : Each of the three allocations would survive - because a prudent player would not
be lured into forming a blocking pair with the odd-man-out since he could in turn become the
odd-man-out - and every other allocation would be blocked even under prudence.
Here we consider whether there is a natural generalization of the “stable set” above to pairing
games with any number of players. We give a partial answer. We show that there is a particular
subset of maximum balanced-aspiration-allocations - that we call pseudostable - which is always in
an “exclusive” Bargaining Set of the game.
Let us recall that, at any balanced aspiration, there is a particular active-minimum matching
with the following odd-cycle property : Each active unmatched player i belongs to a distinct cycle
- with at least three players - in which every player demands her two neighbors and every player
other than i is matched to a neighbor ; namely, no active unmatched player is “solitary”. We call
such a matching solitary-null.
Definition 5 We call a balanced-aspiration-allocation uµ pseudostable if µ is solitary-null.
Remark 5 Let u be any balanced aspiration. Recall that the set of maximum-stable allocations
generated by u is BAA(u) = {uµ |µ active-minimum at u}. The set of pseudostable allocations
generated by u is
P SA(u) = {uµ |µ solitary-null} ⊂ {uµ |µ active-minimum} = BAA(u).
Not surprisingly, pseudostable and semistable allocations are closely related : Let (u, µ, χ) be any
essential semistable allocation at u and H ⊂ N be the players in the half-matching χ. As previously
noted, H partitions into k odd-cycles Ci each associated with an active unmatched player i. In fact,
µ0 is a solitary-null matching at u iff
µ0 = µ ∪ µ1 ... ∪ µk
where µi is a matching in Ci that leaves any one player in Ci unmatched. So there is a solitary-null
matching µ0 at u for every selection of k players from C1 × ... × Ck . Associated with each essential
semistable allocation (u, µ, χ) then, we obtain a set of |C1 | × ... × |Ck | solitary-null matchings or
pseudostable allocations. P SA(u) is their union over all the essential semistable allocations at u.
24

Binmore also showed that each allocation in the “stable set” is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a

sequential bargaining game. Bennett (1997) has shown for a general class of cooperative games that there always
exist “consistent endogenous outside-options”, that they are aspirations, and that a large set of aspirations turn out
as the SPE outcomes of sequential bargaining games.
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Having defined pseudostable allocations, let us define a Bargaining Set. There are several
definitions and variants. We employ the Demand Bargaining Set proposed by Morelli and Montero
(2003) which is a refinement of the well-known Bargaining Set proposed by Zhou (1994)). The
latter has the following definition :
Let υ be an allocation. An objection against υ is a pair (T, υ 0 ) where T ⊂ N and υ 0 is an
allocation for the restricted game (T, f ) such that
υi0 > υi for i ∈ T .
A counterobjection to (T, υ 0 ) is a pair (Q, υ 00 ) where Q ⊂ N and υ 00 is an allocation for the restricted
game (Q, f ) such that
Q − T 6= ∅, T − Q 6= ∅, T ∩ Q 6= ∅,
υi00 ≥ υi for i ∈ Q − T and υi00 ≥ υi0 for i ∈ T ∩ Q.
An objection against υ is justified if there is no counterobjection to it. An allocation is in the Zhou
Bargaining Set Z if there is no justified objection against it.
It is well known that a Bargaining Set - Z included - is typically “large” and not sufficiently
exclusive in describing bargaining outcomes. Our main reason in employing the Demand Bargaining
Set D is that D is more exclusive than Z. We give the definition of D by stating the differences
it has with the definition of Z.25 There are four differences :
(i) the allocation υ is an aspiration-allocation, let υ = uµ ,26
(ii) υi00 = ui for i ∈ Q,
(iii) υi00 > υi0 for i ∈ T ∩ Q,
(iv) Q − T or T − Q may be empty.27
Remark 6 There will in general be many allocations that belong to Z but not to D. This is because
D admits aspiration-allocations only and because - primarily by condition (ii) - counterobjection in
D is highly restricted than in Z.
In Appendix C we give a characterization for the Demand Bargaining Set from which follows
our main result :
25
26

The definition of D in Morelli and Montero (2003) is for TU games.
Morelli and Montero (2003) allow more general allocations but then show that the Demand Bargaining Set

consists of aspiration-allocations.
27
Note that if condition (iv) were excluded then D would be a subset of Z. We show in Appendix C (Lemma 12)
that condition (iv) is in fact vacuous and D is a subset of Z. Morelli and Montero (2003) show the same for TU
games.
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Theorem 3 Pseudostable allocations are in the Demand Bargaining Set.
Theorem 3 says that pseudostable allocations are “stable” from an “exclusive” Bargaining Set
perspective. By the same perspective, on the other hand, there may be other “stable” allocations.
Examples in Appendix C show that these may in fact be various not fitting into a classification at
hand. The Demand Bargaining Set may actually contain a non-balanced aspiration-allocation even
when there is a competitive equilibrium at some other aspiration.28 In the next section, we give a
coordinated Market Procedure that always arrives at a balanced aspiration.

6

Market Procedure

Here we give a Procedure for finding a balanced aspiration. For simplicity, we restrict our presentation to heterogenously linear partnership functions that have the form fij (uj ) = cij − qij uj .29 The
Procedure starts from any aspiration, generates a piecewise linear path of aspirations, and stops in
a bounded number of steps at a balanced aspiration.
Here is a preview : The Procedure is coordinated by a Center that displays an aspiration at each
moment and players register their demand sets at that aspiration. (Since demand is reciprocal, i
registers j if and only if j registers i.) The Center observes all demand and stops if there is no sellermarket. Otherwise, the Center identifies a set of players who constitute a seller-market and alters
the aspiration continously along a suitable direction. The direction is reset when the seller-market
changes.
The Center can actually choose any seller-market. In the Procedure we present here, it is the
“grand” Seller-Market - the union of all “unitary” seller-markets - that is chosen at each aspiration.
The Center is able to identify the Seller-Market continuously by a simple recursive algorithm that
we spell out in the subsection below. This is based on the characterization of Seller-Markets via
“solitary-minimum” matchings that we give in Theorem 5 in Appendix A.
There is a single criterion for admitting a direction d at any aspiration u on the path, namely the
requirement that the Seller-Market at u+λd be identical to the Seller-Market at u for all sufficiently
small λ > 0. When the Seller-Market changes at an aspiration and d is no longer “Seller-MarketPreserving” (definition below), the Center needs to find a new Seller-Market-Preserving direction.
On the quasilinear domain, the direction that has the entry +1 for every Seller, −1 for every Buyer
and 0 for all other players ensures this. On the heterogeneously linear domain, the Center determines
28

This may be compared with Klijn and Masso (2003) who show that the core in the discrete two-sided case is

essentially equivalent to the Zhou Bargaining Set.
29
The extension to games with piecewise linear partnership functions can be carried by adaptation from Alkan
(1992,1997).
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differential rates by interacting with the Sellers and Buyers about their “marginal” demand sets.
This is described in the Direction Procedure below.
To conclude the preview, there is actually one other situation where the Center has to reset
the direction. This occurs when the path arrives at an aspiration where the Seller-Market has not
changed but would change for any continuation along the current direction. Such a situation may
arise only when a new demand is registered by a Buyer Seller pair. This does not occur on the
quasilinear domain.
Formally, let u be an aspiration and d be a feasible direction (namely, a vector in RN such that
u + λd is an aspiration for λ > 0 sufficiently small.) By linearity of the partnership functions, the
demand graph
D(u + λd) = {ij|j ∈ Di (u + λd)}
is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0. We denote this graph
D+ (u, d)
and call it the outgoing directional demand graph at u in the direction d. We will say that d is
Seller-Market-Preserving at u if the Seller-Market at u is identical to the Seller-Market in D+ (u, d).
Similarly D(u − λd) = {ij|j ∈ Di (u − λd)} is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0 which we
denote
D− (u, d)
and call the incoming directional demand graph. Likewise the set of active players A(u − λd) is
identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0 which we denote
A− (u, d).
Clearly, demand changes at u if and only if
D(u) 6= D− (u, d) or A(u) 6= A− (u, d).
It is important to note this may happen finitely often and when it does
D(u) ⊃ D− (u, d),
A(u) ⊂ A− (u, d).

Market Procedure
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper911
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Step 0 : Take any aspiration u = u0 .
Step t : End if there is no seller-market at ut . Otherwise, find a Seller-MarketPreserving direction dt by the Direction Procedure below. Then, display the aspiration
ut + λdt
as λ increases above 0 and let the Buyers in the Seller-Market register the changes in
their demand sets or indicate whether they become nonactive. Stop at the smallest
λ = λ∗ such that dt is not Seller-Market-Preserving at ut + λ∗ dt . Set
ut+1 = ut + λ∗ dt .
Let us suppress reference to ut and write D = D(ut ), D+ (e) = D+ (ut , e). Let (B ∗ , S ∗ ) be the
Seller-Market at ut . The Procedure below utilizes the information
fij0 = −qij .

The Direction Procedure
Step 0 : Set the initial direction to be the vector e0 where e0i is equal to 1 if i ∈ S ∗ ,
minj Di {qij } if i ∈ B ∗ , and 0 otherwise.
Step k : End if the Seller-Market (B ∗ , S ∗ ) in the demand graph D is the Seller+
k
t
k
Market in the directional demand graph DB
∗ (e ) and set d = e . Otherwise, find the
+
k
k
Seller Set S k in DB
∗ (e ) and set ei (δ) equal to

(1 + δ)eki for iS k ,
eki for i(S ∗ − S k ),
min{qij ekj } for iB ∗ .
j Di

Then alter the direction ek (δ) by increasing δ continuously above 0 to δ ∗ where a new
+
k
k+1
pair joins DB
= ek (δ ∗ ).
∗ (e (δ)). Set e

The Direction Procedure30 finds a Seller-Market preserving direction at ut : This can be seen in
the proof of Lemma 7 in Appendix B.
30

Has been adapted from Alkan (1992,1997) where it is given for arbitrary piecewise linear partnership functions.

On the present domain, it is a “multiplicative” analog of the well-known DGS auction (1986) and has identical
convergence properties.
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Theorem 4 The Market Procedure reaches a balanced aspiration in a bounded number of steps.
It is immediate from the stopping rule that the Market Procedure ends at a balanced aspiration.
We state below the main reason why it converges in a bounded31 number of steps : Three attributes
of the Seller-Market - the excess in the Seller-Market, the number of Sellers, the Seller-Market itself
- are lexicographically monotone along the Procedure Path.
Lemma 2 Let (ut ) be any sequence of aspirations generated by the Market Procedure, (Bt , St ) be
the Seller-Market at ut and at = |Bt | − |St | , bt = |St |. Then, for all t,
at+1 ≤ at ,
and if at+1 = at then
bt+1 ≥ bt ,
moreover if at+1 = at and bt+1 = bt then
(Bt+1 , St+1 ) = (Bt , St ).
We prove Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 in Appendix D.
Remark 7 The Market Procedure is based on identifying the Seller-Market at aspirations on the
Procedure Path where demand changes. It would be computationally demanding if this had to done
from scratch each time. This is not the case. In Appendix D, we give a simple Algorithm that generates successive solitary-minimum matchings and solitary-player sets - recursively - at aspirations
where demand changes. By Theorem 5, then, the Seller-Market is identifiable recursively. In result,
the Algorithm and the Direction Procedure together specify a “dynamic” Market Procedure that is
computationally efficacious.

7

Concluding Remarks

We have given a comprehensive analysis for pairing games or markets which are the non-two-sided
and NTU generalization of assignment games. The complexity that these two aspects bring remain
separate : In fact the Direction Lemma (Appendix B) captures nearly all that is essential in our
31

It can be shown by an argument similar to the one given in Alkan (1992,1997) that, in fact, the number of steps

is polynomially bounded.
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treatment of the NTU aspect32 and a substantial part of our work would have to be carried in nearly
the same way if we had stayed on the TU domain - e.g, our characterization of the Seller-Market and
its identification on the Procedure Path or our Bargaining Set analysis. Also, there are significant
differences between what results hold on the TU vs NTU domains but these are not so surprising.
The sharpest difference we have pointed out is the fact that the Equilibrium Set does not have the
stable bipartition property on the NTU domain that it has on the TU domain.
We have looked at pairing games from both a coalitional game and a market equilibrium perspective. In our context essential blocking coalitions are pairs. Relatedly, stable and competitive
equilibrium allocations coincide when they exist. In fact, in our first solution concept extension
- half-partnerships and semistable allocations - stable and competitive equilibrium allocations do
coincide.
In the second extension - Bargaining Set stability and pseudostable allocations - coalitions of
all sizes may be essential, coincidence breaks down and “market forces” may be ineffective. The
exclusive Demand Bargaining Set (Morelli and Montero 2003) we have employed here is in a way
market-based because it admits aspiration-allocations only and aspirations are market-prices.33
Still, as we have shown, it may contain allocations ”distant” to market equilibrium. It would be of
interest what refinement of the Demand Bargaining Set would still contain pseudostable allocations
or what additional criteria characterize them. Pairing games are surely a relatively tractable class
of coalitional games. Our work here shows that they are at the same time an interesting class for
reviewing the various Bargaining Set solution concepts.
Finally a remark about a limiting case of our model : The partnership functions in our model do
not allow “flats” that arise under budget constraints for example. The broader model that allows
for flats can be uniformly approximated by our model and existence results would carry over. On
the other hand, some of our results on the properties of the Equilibrium Set do not and designing
a Market procedure appears more involved.34
32

We have adapted the Direction Lemma from our earlier work on the NTU assignment game where it has

sometimes been referred to as the Perturbation Lemma : Alkan (1989,1992,1997),, Alkan and Gale (1990), Alkan,
Demange and Gale (1991). There are only a few other papers on the NTU assignment game : Moldovanu (1990),
Kucuksenel (2011).
33
Bennett (1983,1997) and Bennett and Zame (1988) have elaborated on the market aspect of aspirations in their
work on general coalitional games.
34
Alkan, Anbarci and Sarpça (2012) is an exercise in this domain.
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A

Mathematical Section

Let (N, f ) be a pairing game and u be any aspiration. In this section we use elementary notions
from graph theory to make some observations about the demand graph D(u). The main tool is a
“maximum-cardinality” matching that we call active-minimum. Our main objective is to define a
unique Seller-Market at u and to identify it via certain active-minimum matchings.

A.1

Definition : the Seller-Market is the Union of all Unitary Markets

Definition 6 A unitary market at u is a seller-market (B, S) where |B| − |S| = 1 and S is
matchable into B − i for every i ∈ B.
It is in general not true that the union of two seller-markets is a seller-market : For example, suppose D(u) = {13, 23, 34, 45} among five active players. Both ({1, 2, 4} , {3, 5}) and ({1, 2, 5} , {3, 4})
are seller-markets but not their union ({1, 2, 4, 5} , {3, 4, 5}). Note that each of the two seller-markets
here contains the unitary seller-market ({1, 2} , {3}).
The importance of unitary markets is that union of unitary markets is a seller-market. We omit
the straightforward proof. We call the union of all unitary markets the Seller-Market at u.

A.2

Active-Minimum Matchings and µi −Markets

Let µ be a matching at u. A player i is active-unmatched if i is active at u and not matched by µ.
Let A(µ) be the set of active-unmatched players at µ.
Let i ∈ A(µ). The following are standard definitions : We say j is µ-reachable from i if there is
a sequence of distinct players
i0 , i1 , ..., in−1 ; j1 , ..., jn
where i0 = i, jn = j 6= i, ik−1 jk ∈ D(u), and
ik jk ∈ µ,
for every k ≤ n − 1. Let i0 , i1 , ..., in−1 ; j1 , ..., jn be such a sequence from i = i0 . If jn is unmatched,
then µ can be augmented to the matching that contains the pairs ik−1 jk - instead of the pairs ik jk
- and matches at least one more active player. If jn is matched with a nonactive player, then µ can
be alternated to the matching that contains the pairs ik−1 jk - instead of the pairs ik jk and jn µ(jn )
- and matches one more active player.
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Definition 7 A matching µ is active-minimum if |A(µ)| ≤ |A(µ0 )| for every matching µ0 at u.35 ,36
Let µ be active-minimum and i ∈ A(µ).
We refer to the sequence i0 , i1 , ..., in ; j1 , ..., jn - where i0 = i, jn = j, ik−1 jk ∈ D(u), ik jk ∈ µ - as
a µ-sequence from i ; we say it is cyclic or a µi −cycle if
i0 in ∈ D(u),
and call it cycle-free if there is no player im such that
im in ∈ D(u).
We say player i is µ−cyclic if there is a µi −cycle.

i0

j1

j2

i1

i2

(a) cycle-free

i0

j1

j2

i1

i2

(b) cyclic

i0

j1

j2

i1

i2

(c) not cycle-free

Figure 3: µ-sequences

Definition 8 Let (I, J) be the pair of player sets where J is the set of all µ-reachable players from
i and I = i ∪ µ(J). We call (I, J) the µ-market from i or the µi -market at u.
Note that, in a µi -market (I, J), I consists of active players for otherwise µ could be alternated
to match an additional active player. Also, by “reachability”, the demand sets of I-players are in
J and µ(J) ⊂ I. Thus a µi -market is a submarket at u. It need not be bipartite.
Example 3 Suppose there are three players all active at u and D(u) = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}. Consider
the matching µ = {2, 3}. The µ-sequence 1, 2; 3 reaches 3 from 1. The µ1 -market is (I, J) =
({1, 2} , {3}) and bipartite. Now suppose D(u) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)}. In this case, the µ1 -market
is ({1, 2, 3} , {2, 3}) and not bipartite.
35

A matching at u has maximum-cardinality if it contains a maximum number of pairs. A characterization

statement for active-minimum matchings, similar to the characterization for maximum cardinality matchings by
Berge (1957), would say : A matching µ is active-minimum if and only if every µ-reachable player from an activeunmatched player is matched with an active player.
36
An active-minimum matching has maximum-cardinality unless it can be augmented to a matching that contains
two additional nonactive players. There is always an active-minimum matching which has maximum-cardinality.
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The following is a straightforward observation.
Lemma 3 A µi -market is bipartite if and only if every µ-sequence from i is cycle-free.
Proof. The “only if” part is clear from Example 3. For the “if” part, note that since µ is activeminimum, the demand set of every I-player is in J, so it remains to show I ∩ J = ∅. Suppose not :
0
Then there are two µ-sequences i0 , i1 , ..., in ; j1 , ..., jn and i00 , i01 , ..., i0m ; j10 , ..., jm
from i0 = i00 = i and

a smallest index k such that (say)
jk = i0k0
for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n and 1 ≤ k 0 ≤ m . Then k 6= 1 for otherwise the µ-sequence i00 , i01 , ..., i0k0 ; j10 , ..., jk0 0
is cyclic. For k ≥ 2, the µ-sequence i000 , i001 , .., i00n00 ; j100 , ..., jn0000 where i000 , i001 , .., i00k0 = i00 , i01 , .., i0k0 and
j100 , ..., jk000 = j10 , ..., jk0 also i00k0 +1 , .., i00n00 = jk−1 , ..., j1 and jk000 +1 , ..., jn0000 = ik−1 , .., i1 is cyclic because
i00n00 = j1 . Contradiction.
Remark 8 A bipartite µi -market (I, J) is a unitary market : To see this, note first that (I, J) is a
seller market with unit excess, and that, for any i0 ∈ I − i, since µ(i0 ) is µ-reachable from i, µ can
be alternated to a matching that matches J to I − i0 .
Below we introduce a class of active-minimum matchings µ for which µ-markets from solitary
players are bipartite.

A.3

Solitary-Minimum Matchings and Solitary-Player Markets

Let µ be an active-minimum matching. We distinguish between the players in A(µ) according to
whether they are µ-cyclic : We call a µ-cyclic player nonsolitary and a non-µ-cyclic player solitary.
Lemma 4 Let µ, µ0 be any two active-minimum matchings at u. A player who is nonsolitary
(solitary) at µ is either matched or nonsolitary (solitary) at µ0 .
Proof. If a player i is nonsolitary at µ, then there is a µ-cycle i0 , i1 , ..., in ; j1 , ..., jn from i0 = i.
Let ν be an active-minimum matching where in is unmatched. Suppose i is unmatched at µ0 and
0
consider the µ0 -sequence C = i00 , i01 , ..., i0m ; j10 , ..., jm
from i00 = i with jk0 = υ(i0k−1 ) and maximum

length m. If i0m is matched in ν, say ν(i0m ) = j, then either µ0 is not active-minimum (when j is
unmatched in µ0 ) or m is not maximum length. Therefore, i0m must be unmatched in ν and then
i0m = in (otherwise i0m is ν-reachable from in and so ν is not active-minimum). Hence, C is cyclic
and so i is nonsolitary at µ0 .
We now give our main definition : Let Z(µ) denote the set of all solitary players at µ.
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Definition 9 An active-minimum matching µ is solitary-minimum if |Z(µ)| ≤ |Z(µ0 )| for every
active-minimum matching µ0 at u. A µi -market is a solitary-player market if i is solitary and µ is
solitary-minimum.

1

2

4

3

5

1

(a) not solitary-minimum

2

4

3

5

(b) solitary-minimum

Figure 4: Active-Minimum Matchings
Lemma 5 A solitary-player market is bipartite.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that i is a solitary player at µ and the µi -market is not bipartite.
By Lemma 3, there is a µ-sequence i0 , i1 , ..., in ; j1 , ..., jn from i0 = i such that
im in ∈ D(u)
for some player im 6= i0 . Alternate µ to µ0 which matches i0 but not in . Now in is nonsolitary at µ0 .
0
from i00 = in where i0n−m = im is cyclic.
This is because the µ0 -sequence i00 , i01 , ..., i0n−m ; j10 , ..., jn−m

Note that, except for i0 and in , the unmatched players at µ and µ0 are identical, hence by Lemma
4, except i, the solitary players at µ and µ0 are identical. Then µ0 has one less solitary player than
µ. This contradicts the fact that µ is solitary-minimum.
It follows from Remark 8 that a solitary-player market is a unitary market. The converse is not
true : Consider an aspiration u where demand consists of {(1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4)} among four active
players. Then (B = {1, 2}, S = {4}) is a unitary market but not a solitary-player market at the
solitary-minimum matching µ = {(3, 4)}. Still, the union of all solitary-player markets gives the
union of all unitary markets.

A.4

Main Result : The Seller-Market is the Union of all Solitary-Player
Markets

For any solitary-minimum matching µ, let S µ be the set of all µ-reachable players from players in
Z(µ) and B µ = Z(µ) ∪ µ(S µ ). Note that (B µ , S µ ) is the union of all solitary-player markets at µ.
By Remark 8, (B µ , S µ ) is a seller-market.
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Theorem 5 Let µ be any solitary-minimum matching at u. The Seller-Market at u is the union
of all solitary-player markets, i.e., (B ∗ , S ∗ ) = (B µ , S µ ).
Lemma 6 Let (B, S) be any bipartite submarket and µ be an active-minimum matching at u. Then
there is (i) no unmatched player in S and (ii) no nonsolitary player in B.
Proof. Suppose there is an unmatched player in S. By definition of a submarket, there is a
matching ν that matches S into B. The matching µ0 that agrees with ν for S-players and with
µ for other players matches more active players than µ does. But then µ is not active-minimum.
Contradiction.
Suppose there is a nonsolitary player i ∈ B ∪ S. Then i ∈ B by (i) and there is a µ-cycle
i0 , i1 , ..., in ; j1 , ..., jn from i0 = i with j1 ∈ S. But then, by alternation, there is an active-minimum
matching that leaves j1 unmatched. This contradicts (i).
Proof. (Theorem 5) By Lemma 5 and Remark 8, (B µ , S µ ) ⊂ (B ∗ , S ∗ ). We complete the proof by
showing that (B µ , S µ ) contains every unitary seller-market.
Let (B, S) be any unitary seller-market at u, B0 be the set of all B-players unmatched at µ,
0

S be the set of all µ-reachable players from B0 -players and B 0 = B0 ∪ µ(S 0 ). By Lemma 6(ii)
B0 ⊂ Z(µ) so (B 0 , S 0 ) ⊂ (B µ , S µ ). We will show (B, S) = (B 0 , S 0 ).
By construction, no B 0 -player has demand for any player in S − S 0 (since S − S 0 is “unreachable”
from B0 ). Also µ(B − B 0 ) ⊂ (S − S 0 ) since µ(S 0 ) ⊂ B 0 . Therefore µ matches B − B 0 to S − S 0
(otherwise S is not matchable into B.) Then B − B 0 and S − S 0 must be empty because (B, S) is
unitary (otherwise S is not matchable into B − i for some i ∈ B − B 0 .)
The Market Procedure we give in Section 6 is a Seller-Market tracing procedure. We use the
following fact in proving its convergence.
Corollary 1 The excess in the Seller-Market at u is equal to the number of solitary players at any
solitary-minimum matching at u.
We refer to a solitary-minimum matching with no solitary player as a solitary-null matching.
Corollary 2 An aspiration is balanced if and only if it admits a solitary-null matching.
The statement below gives a characterization for solitary-minimum matchings : The “only if”
part follows from the proof of Lemma 5 and the “if” part follows from Theorem 5.
Corollary 3 An active-minimum matching µ is solitary-minimum if and only if all the µ-sequences
from solitary players are cycle-free.37
37

Corollary 3 is the counterpart of the characterization for active-minimum matchings in Footnote 35 and would

be used to find a solitary-minimum matching in any demand graph.
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Remark 9 It also follows from Theorem 5 that the Seller-Market is the maximum-excess bipartite
submarket with minimum size. In particular, maximum-excess bipartite submarkets are closed under
intersection hence there is a unique minimum-size maximum-excess bipartite submarket, namely,
the Seller-Market.

B

Proofs for Sections 3 and 4

The proof of Theorem 1 uses the key result below. We say (N, f ) is piecewise linear if every fij is
piecewise linear.
Recall that a feasible direction at an aspiration u is a nonzero vector d ∈ RN such that u + λd
is an aspiration for all sufficiently small λ > 0. Given a feasible direction d at u, if fij are piecewise
linear, the demand graph D(u + λd) is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0 which we denote
D+ (u, d).
Lemma 7 ( Direction Lemma) Let (N, f ) be piecewise linear. If (B, S) is a bipartite submarket at
an aspiration u, then there is a feasible direction d with
di < 0 for i ∈ B,
di > 0 for i ∈ S,
di = 0 for i ∈ N − B ∪ S
such that (B, S) is a bipartite submarket at u + λd for all sufficiently small λ > 0.
Proof. Let fij0 denote the right-hand derivative of fij . Take any d ∈ RN such that
di > 0 for i ∈ S,
di = max {fij0 (uj )dj } for i ∈ B,
j ∈Di (u)

di = 0 for i ∈ N − B ∪ S.
+
Clearly, d is a feasible direction at u. Let ν be any active-minimum matching in DB
(u, d). If ν

matches every S-player, then (B, S) is a bipartite submarket at u + λd for all sufficiently small
λ > 0. Therefore, suppose ν does not match every S-player. Let B 0 be the set of all unmatched
+
B-players and S 0 be the set of all S-players which are ν-reachable from B 0 -players in DB
(u, d).
+
+
We claim that there is a feasible direction d∗ such that ν ⊂ DB
(u, d∗ ) and (i) DB
(u, d∗ ) contains

a matching of greater cardinality than ν or else (ii) the set of all S-players, say S ∗ , which are
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+
ν-reachable from B 0 -players in DB
(u, d∗ ) has a greater cardinality than S 0 . By recursion, this will

prove the lemma since S is a finite set.
Set di (δ) equal to
(1 + δ)di for i ∈ S 0 and di for i ∈ S − S 0 ,
max {fij0 (uj )dj (δ)} for i ∈ B,

j ∈Di (u)

0 for i ∈ N − B ∪ S.
Alter the direction d(δ) by increasing δ continuously above 0 up to δ ∗ where a new pair ij joins
+
+
+
+
DB
(u, d(δ)). Set d∗ = d(δ ∗ ). Note that DB
(u, d) ⊂ DB
(u, d∗ ) and hence ν ⊂ DB
(u, d∗ ). Let

B = B 0 ∪ ν(S 0 ). See that (i, j) ∈ B × (S − S 0 ). Therefore, player j is ν-reachable from B 0 , i.e.,
+
(u, d∗ ), in which case claim (i)
j ∈ S ∗ . If j is unmatched at ν, then ν is not active-minimum at DB

holds. Otherwise, S ∗ has a greater cardinality than S 0 since j ∈ S ∗ − S 0 and S 0 ⊂ S ∗ . In this case,
claim (ii) holds. End of claim.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 : Suppose (N, f ) is piecewise linear. For any aspiration u and any
seller-market (B, S) at u, let gS (u) be the sum of ui for i ∈ S, and let g(u) be the maximum of
gS (u) over all seller-markets at u. Since the set of aspirations is nonempty and closed, there is an
aspiration u∗ such that g(u∗ ) is maximum among all aspirations. Then u∗ has no seller-market,
for otherwise by the Direction Lemma, there is an aspiration u0 with g(u0 ) > g(u∗ ) contradicting
maximality of u∗ . So there exists a balanced aspiration for every piecewise linear (N, f ) and by
uniform approximation for (N, f ). 
+
−
Lemma 8 The demand set of every Nuu
0 -player at u is in Nuu0 .

Proof. If i demands j at u and u0 is an aspiration with u0i < ui , then u0j ≥ fji (u0i ) > fji (ui ) = uj .
+
Lemma 9 Let u be a balanced aspiration and u0 be any aspiration. Then Nuu
0 is matchable into
−
Nuu
0 at u.
+
+
0
0
Proof. Every player in Nuu
0 is active at u (otherwise ui < 0 for some i ∈ Nuu0 hence u is not an
+
−
aspiration.) Suppose Nuu
0 is not matchable into Nuu0 at u. Let µ be a matching at u that matches a
+
i
maximum number of players in Nuu
0 and let i be a player unmatched. Let (B, S) be the µ -market
+
−
at u. By Lemma 8 and maximality of µ, using induction, S ⊂ Nuu
0 and µ(S) ⊂ Nuu0 . But then

(B, S) is a seller-market at u. Contradiction.
+
−
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 : By Lemma 9, Nuu
0 is matchable into Nuu0 at u and symmetrically
+
−
+
−
Nu+0 u is matchable into Nu−0 u at u0 . Then, (Nuu
0 , Nuu0 ) and (Nu0 u , Nu0 u ) are bipartite submarkets at u
+
−
and u0 respectively, so Nuu
0 = Nuu0 , therefore they are balanced-markets. 
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Lemma 10 Let u, u0 be any two balanced aspirations. Then u is a stable allocation if and only if
u0 is a stable allocation.
+
−
Proof. Suppose (u, µ) is a stable allocation. Then µ matches Nuu
0 and Nuu0 to each other (otherwise
+
µ leaves a player i in Nuu
0 unmatched, which is not possible, because i is active). So
0
0
µ(Nuu
0 ) ⊂ Nuu0 ,
+
−
0
0
where Nuu
Let µ0 be the set of all pairs ij ∈ µ with i, j ∈ Nuu
0 = N − (Nuu0 ∪ Nuu0 ).
0 . By
+
−
Proposition 1, there is a matching ν at u0 that matches Nuu
0 and Nuu0 to each other. The matching
0
0
that agrees with µ0 for Nuu
0 -players and with ν otherwise is u -compatible and leaves no active

player unmatched. So u0 is a stable allocation.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 : Case (i) : There is a stable allocation. By Lemma 10, U is the set
of all stable allocations.
Case (ii) : There is no stable allocation. Take any u ∈ U . Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching
at u. By Corollary 2, every active-unmatched player is nonsolitary. For every nonsolitary i, pick
a µ-cycle Ci = i0 , i1 , ..., in , j1 , ..., jn . Let µi and νi respectively be the matchings that consist of all
pairs ik jk and ik−1 jk with jk ∈ Ci . Let νi0 = νi ∪ i0 in and µ+ , ν + respectively be the union of µi , νi0
over all unmatched i. Denote ν the matching µ − µ+ and χ the half-matching µ+ ∪ ν + . Thus the
semi-matching (ν, χ) leaves no active player unmatched. Hence u is a semistable allocation. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 : By Theorem 1, there is a balanced aspiration, say u. We will
show that u is a stable allocation. Suppose not.
Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching at u. Since u is nonrealizable, µ leaves an active player
unmatched, say i. Note that i is nonsolitary at µ, because otherwise by Lemma 5 u has a sellermarket and is not balanced.
Let C be a µ-cycle from i which consists of a maximum number of players. Since there are an
odd number of players in C, there must be two same-type players, say j, j 0 , such that j is in C and
j 0 is not in C. We claim
uj = uj 0 .
If not, then uj < uj 0 (otherwise no C-player demands j at u contradicting j ∈ C). Then no
player other than j demands j 0 at u. So Dj 0 (u) = {j} (otherwise Dj 0 (u) is empty but j 0 is active
at u). Hence j 0 is unmatched at u. But then µ is augmentable contradicting the fact that µ is
active-minimum. End of claim.
Therefore there is a C-player who demands j 0 at u. Then j 0 must be matched at u (otherwise
µ is augmentable therefore not active-minimum). But then there is a µ-cycle from i (obtained by
“adding” the pair (j 0 , µ(j 0 )) to C) which contains a greater number of players. Contradiction. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 : Let i be a nonconstant player and let u be any aspiration in
+
−
U. Take any u0 ∈ U such that ui 6= u0i . By Lemma 1, (Nuu
0 , Nuu0 ) is a balanced-market at u.
+
Case (i) : Let (u, µ) be a stable allocation. Every Nuu
0 -player is active at u so in µ(N ). Then µ
+
−
+
−
+
−
matches Nuu
0 to Nuu0 . Recall i is in Nuu0 ∪ Nuu0 . So µ(i) is also in Nuu0 ∪ Nuu0 hence a nonconstant

player.
−
Case (ii) : Let (u, ν, χ) be a semistable allocation. Any player with whom an Nuu
0 -player is in
+
half-partnership or full-partnership must be in Nuu
0 , for otherwise by balancedness there would be
+
an Nuu
0 -player unmatched or single-half-matched contradicting (u, ν, χ) is semistable. In particular
−
+
−
ν(Nuu
0 ) ⊂ Nuu0 . Also no Nuu0 -player is in half-partnership because otherwise there would be an
+
−
−
+
even half-partner cycle in Nuu
Then ν(Nuu
0 ∪ Nuu0 contradicting (u, ν, χ) is essential.
0 ) = Nuu0
+
because otherwise an Nuu
0 -player is unmatched contradicting (u, ν, χ) is semistable. Thus ν(i) is in
+
−
Nuu
0 ∪ Nuu0 hence a nonconstant player. 

Lemma 11 There is a stable bipartition at any υ in V.
Proof. Suppose there is no stable bipartition at some υ in V. Let υ 0 be any payoff in V where
+
−
Nυυ
0 ∪ Nυυ 0 contains a maximum number of players. Then, there exist a nonconstant player i such
+
−
00
that υi = υi0 (otherwise (Nυυ
be a payoff
0 , Nυυ 0 ) is a stable bipartition at υ by Lemma 1). Let υ

in V such that υi00 6= υi0 . By Lemma 1, (Nυ+0 υ00 , Nυ−0 υ00 ) is a bipartite market at υ 0 . By Lemma 7, pick
a payoff υ ∗ in V that is sufficiently close to υ 0 such that υi0 6= υi∗ . Then, υj∗ 6= υj for every j in
+
−
+
−
∗
0
0
0
∗
Nυυ
0 ∪ Nυυ 0 since υj 6= υj for every j in Nυυ 0 ∪ Nυυ 0 . Also, υi 6= υi (since υi = υi and υi 6= υi ).

Contradiction.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 : (i) Let υ, υ 0 any payoffs in V and suppose υ and υ 0 are realizable
respectively by µ and µ0 . We claim µ ⊂ D(υ 0 ) which completes the proof.
+
−
By Lemma 1, µ, µ0 both match Nυυ
0 and Nυυ 0 to each other. Suppose the claim is not true. Then
+
−
0
there is a pair (i, j) ∈ (Nυυ
0 , Nυυ 0 ) such that ij ∈ µ − D(υ ). Let i1 = i and I = {i1 , ..., in } , J =

{j1 , ..., jn } be the player sets defined recursively by setting jk = µ(ik ) and ik+1 = µ0 (jk ). Then
(in+1 , jn+1 ) = (i1 , j1 ).
−
+
+
−
+
0
0
≥ cik jk − υj0 k
Clearly I ⊂ Nυυ
0 and J ⊂ Nυυ 0 (since µ(Nυυ 0 ) = µ (Nυυ 0 ) = Nυυ 0 .) Then cik jk−1 − υj
k−1

since ik jk−1 ∈ D(υ 0 ) and cik jk − υjk ≥ cik jk−1 − υjk−1 since ik jk ∈ D(υ) for all k. So
υj0 k−1 − υjk−1 ≤ υj0 k − υjk
for all k. But then υj0 1 − υj1 = υj0 n − υjn . Therefore i1 j1 ∈ D(υ 0 ) (since i1 j1 ∈ D(υ), i1 jn ∈ D(υ 0 )).
Contradiction.
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(ii ) By Lemma 11, let (Y1 , Y2 ) be a stable bipartition at some υ in V . By Lemma 3, (Y1 , Y2 ) is
a stable bipartition at V . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 : Consider any piecewise linear game. Let K be any finite
collection of balanced aspirations. Let u be any balanced aspiration in U at which ui ∈ med(K)i
for a maximum number of players. We claim ui ∈ med(K)i for every i. Suppose not. Then the sets
∗
B = {i ∈ N | u∗∗
i < ui } and S = {i ∈ N | ui < ui } cannot both be empty. Note that players in B

and S are nonconstant players.
0
0
∗
0
Define U 0 = {u0 ∈ U |u∗∗
/ B ∪ S}. Clearly
i ≤ ui for i ∈ B, ui ≤ ui for i ∈ S, and ui = ui for i ∈
P
P 0
0
0
U is nonempty and closed. So there is a υ ∈ U such that
υi ≤
ui for every u0 ∈ U 0 . If
i∈B

i∈B

∗
υi = u∗∗
i for some i ∈ B or υi = ui for some i ∈ S, then there would be an additional player i
∗
with υi ∈ med(K)i . Contradiction. So B = {i ∈ N | u∗∗
i < υi } and S = {i ∈ N | ui < υi }. By

Proposition 2, there is a matching at υ, say µ, that matches all the nonconstant players (among
each other.)
Let n = m when |K| is odd and n = m + 1 when |K| is even.
Let i be any player in S and j = µ(i). By Lemma 1, u0j < υj for every u0 ∈ U such that u0i > υi .
Since at least n elements of K give a higher payoff to i than υ, at least n elements of K give a lower
payoff to j than υ. Hence j ∈ B. Thus S is matchable into B at υ.
Let i be any player in B and j ∈ Di (υ). By Lemma 8, u0j > υj for any u0 ∈ U such that u0i < υi .
Since at least n elements of K give a lower payoff to i than υ, at least n elements of K give a higher
payoff to j than υ. Hence j ∈ S and the demand set of every B-player is in S at υ.
Thus (B, S) is a balanced-market at υ. But then, by Lemma 7, there exists υ ∗ ∈ U 0 such that
P ∗ P
υi <
υi . Contradiction. This proves our claim and the Proposition 4 for any piecewise linear
i∈B

i∈B

game. Proposition 4 holds for any game by uniform approximation. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 : Suppose U is the Equilibrium Set of a piecewise linear game.
+
−
Take any u, u0 in U . By Proposition 1 the pair of player sets (Nuu
0 , Nuu0 ) is a balanced-market and

by Lemma 7 there exist payoffs between u, u0 that belong to U . By uniform approximation, the
result holds for any game. 

C

Addendum to Section 5

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 : Let u be a balanced aspiration and u0 be any aspiration. Let µ0
be any matching at u0 and

+
µ0+ = ij ∈ µ0 |i ∈ Nuu
.
0
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−
+
0
0
0
0
By Lemma 8 the demand set of every Nuu
0 -player is in Nuu0 at u . So the matching µ0 = µ − µ+
+
−
0
0
contains only players in Nuu
0 = N − (Nuu0 ∪ Nuu0 ) = {i ∈ N |ui = ui }. Using Lemma 9, let µ+ be a
+
−
matching at u that matches Nuu
0 into Nuu0 . It is clear that

µ = µ00 ∪ µ+
is a matching at u. We show below that the number of active-unmatched players that µ0 leaves at
u0 is more than that of µ leaves at u.
−
+
0
Since the demand set of every Nuu
0 -player at u is in Nuu0 ,
−
+
µ0 (Nuu
0 ) ⊂ Nuu0 .
0
Let A be the set of all players in N − Nuu
0 who are unmatched at µ and active at u. By definition
−
+
of µ, A ⊂ Nuu
0 − µ(Nuu0 ). Hence
−
+
+
Nuu
0 ≥ µ(Nuu0 ) + |A| = Nuu0 + |A| .
0
0
Let A0 be the set of Nuu
0 -players who are unmatched at µ and active at u but matched at µ . Then
+
µ0 (A0 ) ⊂ Nuu
0 . Therefore
−
+
0
µ0 (Nuu
.
0 ) ≤ Nuu0 − A
−
−
−
0
0
0
So Nuu
0 − µ (Nuu0 ) ≥ |A| + |A |. Recall that Nuu0 -players are active at u . 

C.1

A Characterization of the Demand Bargaining Set

Let D be the Demand Bargaining Set at an aspiration u. Consider the set of active-unmatched
players A(µ). We say that an aspiration-allocation uµ is maximal if there is no ij ∈ D(u) with
i, j ∈ A(µ).
Proposition 7 An aspiration-allocation uµ is in D if and only if uµ is maximal and u has no
balanced market (B, S) with B ⊂ A(µ).
Proof. (⇒) Let uµ be a maximal aspiration-allocation and suppose there is no balanced-market
(B, S) at u such that B ⊂ N − µ(N ). Suppose to the contrary that there is a justified objection
(T, u0 ) to uµ .
Let (u0 , µ0 ) be an allocation for the restricted market (T, f ). Let B = {i ∈ T |u0i < ui }. Then
ui > u0i > uµi for all i ∈ B, so B ⊂ A(µ).
We claim |T − B| ≤ |B| . Suppose not. Since (u0 , µ0 ) is an allocation for (T, f ), there is a pair
ij ∈ µ0 with i, j ∈ T −B . So (u0i , u0j ) ≥ (ui , uj ). Since u is an aspiration, (u0i , u0j ) = (ui , uj ). Therefore
ij ∈ D(u) and (ui , uj ) > (uµi , uµj ), saying of uµ is not maximal. End of claim.
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Now let S be the union of the demand sets of B-players. Suppose S

T. Then, there is a

pair ij ∈ D(u) with i ∈ B and j ∈ S − T. So ((i, j), (ui , uj )) is a counterobjection to (T, u0 ).
Contradiction. Therefore, S ⊂ T. By maximality of uµ , S ∩ A(µ) = ∅. Hence S ⊂ T − B. So from
the claim above |S| ≤ |B| .
Finally let ν be any active-minimum matching in DB (u). It is not possible that ν matches B into
S for otherwise (B, S) would be a balanced-market at u with B ⊂ A(µ). Therefore, since |S| ≤ |B|
as shown above, it must be that ν leaves a player i in B unmatched. Let (Bi , Si ) be the ν i -market.
Then (Bi , Si ) ⊂ (B, S) and (Bi − i, Si ) is a balanced-market at u with Bi − i ⊂ A(µ). Contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose uµ is not maximal. Then there is a pair ij ∈ D(u) with i, j ∈ A(µ). Then
((i, j), (ui , uj )) is a justified objection to uµ . Therefore uµ ∈
/ D.
Consider any piecewise linear game. Suppose there is a balanced-market (B, S) at u wth B ⊂
A(µ). By Lemma 7, let u0 = u + λd, where d is a feasible direction such that di > 0 for all i ∈ S
and di < 0 for all i ∈ B. It is clear that (B ∪ S, u0 ) is a justified objection to uµ for sufficiently small
λ > 0. Hence uµ ∈
/ D. By uniform approximation, the same holds for any game.

C.2

Proof of Theorem 3, Inclusion Lemma and Examples

PROOF OF THEOREM 3 : Suppose uµ is a pseudostable allocation not in D. By Proposition
7, there is a balanced market (B, S) at u such that B ⊂ N − µ(N ). But then, by Corollary 2,
B-players are nonsolitary at µ. This contradicts with Lemma 6(ii). 
Theorem 3 says that pseudostable allocations are “stable” from an “exclusive” Bargaining Set
perspective. It is on the other hand true that the Demand Bargaining Set may contain nonpseudostable allocations. We show in the examples below that these may in fact be various not
fitting into a classification at hand. First, we show that the Demand Bargaining Set is a refinement
of the Zhou Bargaining set :
Lemma 12 D ⊂ Z.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is an aspiration-allocation uµ in D but not in Z. Then,
there is an objection (T, u0 ) to uµ such that any counterobjection (Q, u) to (T, u0 ) satisfies either
Q ⊂ T or T ⊂ Q.
There can be no counterobjection (Q, u) to (T, u0 ) with Q ⊂ T : Otherwise ui > u0i > uµi for
i ∈ Q so (Q, u) is a justified objection to uµ , implying uµ ∈
/ D. Contradiction.
Consider now any counterobjection (Q, u) to (T, u0 ) with T ⊂ Q. Then ui > u0i > uµi for i ∈ T .
Now let (u, µ0 ) be any allocation for the restricted game (Q, f ) and i be any player in T . If µ0 (i) ∈ T,
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then ((i, j), (ui , uj )) is a justified objection to uµ , implying uµ ∈
/ D. Contradiction. If µ0 (i) ∈
/ T,
then ((i, µ0 (i)), (ui , uµ0 (i) )) is a counterobjection to (T, u0 ), but then it is not true that T ⊂ {i, µ0 (i)}
since there are at least two players in T . Contradiction.
Example 4 shows that D may contain some non-pseudostable maximum balanced-aspirationallocations but not all. Example 5 shows that D may contain maximum non-balanced -aspirationallocations. Example 5 also displays dominated allocations that are in Z and not in D. It is worth
adding that the null-allocation is not in D but may be in Z, for instance, in any three-person game
where there is no stable allocation.
Example 4 There are five players in N = {1,2,3,4,5}. The worth of a partnership is 2 for the
pairs in
{12,13,23,34,45}
and 0 otherwise. Let u = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and µ = {12,34} (see Figure 6a). Clearly uµ is a maximum
balanced-aspiration-allocation but µ is not solitary-null at u. Let T = {4,5} and u0 = (u04 , u05 ) =
(1 + , 1 − ) where 0 <  < 1. It is easily checked that (T, u0 ) is a justified objection to uµ so uµ is
not in Z and therefore not in D.
Now consider the extended game with four additional players {6,7,8,9} where the worth of a
partnership is 2 for the pairs in
{12,13,23,34,45,56,67,78,79,89}
and 0 otherwise. Let u = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and µ0 = µ∪{67,89} (see Figure 6b). Clearly, again,
0

uµ is a maximum balanced-aspiration-allocation but µ0 is not solitary-null at u. Using Proposition
0

7, it is easy to see that uµ is in D and therefore in Z.

2

2
4

3
1

5

8
3

4

5

1

6

7
9

(a)

(b)

Figure 5: Example 4
Example 5 There are two sets - I and J - of same-type players where |I| = n ≥ 3 and J consists
of two players say j, j 0 . The worth of a pair with one player from each set is 2 and with both players
from I is 2 − 2 (where 0 <  < 1.) The players j, j 0 cannot form a pair with each other.
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The demand is equal to {ij, ij 0 |i ∈ I} for δ <  (see Figure 7a) and equal to {ij, ij 0 |i ∈ I} ∪
{ii0 |i, i0 ∈ I} for δ =  (see Figure 7b). The payoff u where ui is equal to 1 − δ for i ∈ I and 1 + δ
for j ∈ J is an aspiration for every δ ≤ . (It is a non-balanced aspiration for every δ <  and a
balanced aspiration for δ = .) Let µ be any matching that consists of two pairs ij and i0 j 0 where
i, i0 ∈ I and j, j 0 ∈ J.
It is easily seen that uµ is in Z for any odd n for all δ ≤ . Note that uµ is dominated for
n ≥ 5 : There are n − 2 unmatched I-players all but one of whom can form a pair with another
unmatched I-player and achieve a payoff equal to 1 −  strictly above her stand alone utility.
On the other hand, by Proposition 7, uµ is not in D for n > 3 for any δ ≤ . To see this, let
I0 = {i, i0 } ⊂ I be any two unmatched players. In case δ < , (I 0 , J) is a balanced-market with I0
⊂ N − µ(N ), and in case δ = , uµ is not maximal, so in both cases uµ is not in D by Proposition
7.
It is easily checked that uµ is in D for n = 3 for any δ ≤ .

j1

j2

i1

i2

···

ik

···

in

j1

j2

i1

i2

(a) δ < 

···

ik

···

in

(b) δ = 

Figure 6: Example 5

D

Identifying the Seller-Market Recursively along the Market Procedure Path and Proof of Convergence

Here we present the Seller-Market Algorithm by which the Seller-Market can be identified recursively
along the Procedure Path.
Let u be any aspiration on the (piecewise linear) Path and consider the demand graphs D, D0 , D00
where D is the incoming directional demand graph, D0 the demand graph and D00 the outgoing
directional demand graph at u. Likewise consider the respective sets of active players A, A0 , A00 at
u. (We will say that (D, A), (D0 , A0 ) are successive and so are (D0 , A0 ), (D00 , A00 ).) For all but a finite
number of aspirations on the Path, (D, A) = (D0 , A0 ) = (D00 , A00 ).
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Our main task here is to identify the Seller-Market (B ∗0 , S ∗0 ) in (D0 , A0 ) given the Seller-Market
(B ∗ , S ∗ ) in (D, A) when (D0 , A0 ) 6= (D, A). From Theorem 5, this is equivalent to finding a solitaryminimum matching µ0 and the set of solitary players Z(µ0 ) in (D0 , A0 ) given a solitary-minimum
matching µ and the set of solitary players Z(µ) in (D, A).
Let (D, A), (D0 , A0 ) be successive and recall
D ⊂ D0 , A ⊃ A0 .
The Seller-Market Algorithm consists of the Solitary-Minimal-Matching Routine (SMMR) and
the Solitary-Player Set Routine. The first finds a solitary-minimum matching µ0 in (D0 , A0 ) given a
solitary-minimum matching µ in (D, A). The second identifies Z(µ0 ) given µ, Z(µ) and µ0 found by
SSMR.
Remark 10 There may be several changes between (D, A), (D0 , A0 ). Our Algorithm takes the
changes in D0 − D and A − A0 one at a time in any order. Below we assume that either A − A0
consists of a single player and D = D0 or D0 − D consists of a single pair and A = A0 .
Solitary-Minimal Matching Routine
Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching in (D, A).
Step 1 : If µ is not active-minimum in (D0 , A0 ) then augment/alter µ to an activeminimum matching µ1 . Otherwise, let µ1 = µ.
Step 2 : If µ1 is not solitary-minimum in (D0 , A0 ) then alter µ1 to a solitary-minimum
matching µ2 . Otherwise, let µ2 = µ1 .
Then let µ0 = µ2 .
The Routine above finds a solitary-minimum matching µ0 in (D0 , A0 ). It is an elementary recursion38 and we omit the straightforward proof. It remains to identify Z(µ0 ).
Lemma 13 If (B, S) is a unitary market in (D0 , A0 ), then (B, S) is a seller-market in (D, A).
Proof. Since A0 ⊂ A and D ⊂ D0 , we only need to show that S is matchable into B in D. Let ν
be a matching that matches S into B in D0 . In all cases except when the pair ij in D0 − D is in ν
38

Take any active-unmatched player. If an unmatched player is µ-reachable, then augment µ. If a nonactive

matched player is µ-reachable, then alter µ. Since (D0 , A0 ) differs from (D, A) by a singleton, the active-unmatched
player and the reachability sequence can be selected judiciously. Step 1 thus can be carried out in a simple way. In
particular, µ1 differs from µ by at most a single pair. Similar comments go for Step 2 and µ2 differs from µ1 by at
most a single pair.
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and i ∈ B, j ∈ S, it is clear that ν also matches S into B in D. In the remaining case, let ν 0 be a
matching that matches S into B − i in D0 , then ν 0 is in D.
It is worth pointing out that the result above holds neither for successive unitary markets nor
for successive seller-markets. We use it in proving our key lemma below which says that successive
solitary-player sets Z(µ0 ), Z(µ) are nested when µ0 is selected by SMMR.
Let Z 0 be the set of all players in Z(µ) who are in A0 and not matched by µ0 .
Lemma 14 Z(µ0 ) ⊂ Z 0 ⊂ Z(µ).
Proof. A player i ∈ Z(µ0 ) is in A0 and therefore in A. Also, i is not matched by the matching µ1
that is constructed in SMMR (for otherwise i would not be in Z(µ0 )). Therefore i is not matched by
µ (otherwise i would not be in A0 ). By Theorem 5, then, i belongs to a unitary market in (D0 , A0 ),
and therefore by Lemma 13, to a seller-market in (D, A). Therefore i ∈ Z(µ) by Lemma 6(ii).
Solitary-Player Set Routine
Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching and Z(µ) the solitary-player set in (D, A).
Let µ0 be the solitary-minimum matching in (D0 , A0 ) found by the Solitary-Minimum
Matching Routine. If
µ0 = µ and D0 − D = b1 b2 for some b1 , b2 ∈ B ∗
then b1 , b2 are in a µ0 -cycle C ⊂ D0 , the unmatched player b in C is nonsolitary at µ0 ,
and
Z(µ0 ) = Z(µ) − b,
otherwise
Z(µ0 ) = Z 0 .
Let Z(µ) = Z, Z(µ0 ) = Z 0 . The Routine above merely involves checking which of two cases
occur and updating the solitary-player set accordingly. One of these cases is very particular. Apart
from this case, Z 0 is equal to Z − : In words, the solitary players at µ0 consist of the solitary players
at µ excluding (naturally) those who have become matched or nonactive. In the remaining case,
one solitary player at µ - say b - becomes nonsolitary at µ0 and all the other solitary players (if any)
remain solitary. Thus Z 0 = Z − b. As we show below, this particular case occurs when the “new”
demand in D0 − D is a pair b1 b2 where b1 , b2 are two Buyers in (D, A) and SMMR finds µ0 to be
the same as µ. (So b1 b2 ∈
/ µ0 .) Then, it is a fact that, there is a µ0 -cycle in D0 to which b1 , b2 belong
and whose unmatched player is b = Z − Z 0 . To be precise, b is the player b1 if b1 ∈ Z, b2 ∈ (B ∗ − Z);
otherwise both b1 , b2 ∈ (B ∗ − Z) and b is a player other than b1 , b2 . We prove these assertions below.
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Proposition 8 The Solitary-Player Set Routine finds the solitary set Z 0 in (D0 , A0 ).
Proof. Suppose Z 0 is not equal to Z 0 . Then, by Lemma 14, Z 0 is contained in but not equal to
Z 0 . Let i be any player in Z 0 − Z 0 and (Bi∗ , Si∗ ) be the µi -market in D. We will show that (Claim
1) D0 − D = b1 b2 where b1 , b2 ∈ Bi∗ , (Claim 2) µ = µ0 and Z 0 = Z − i.
Note i is nonsolitary at µ0 in (D0 , A0 ) (since i is in Z 0 − Z 0 ), so there is a µ0 -cycle C =
i0 , i1 , ..., in , j1 , ..., jn in (D0 , A0 ) from i0 = i. Since D0 − D is at most a singleton, i0 j1 or i0 in is
in D. Then j1 or in is in Si∗ (since i ∈ Bi∗ ). Say j1 ∈ Si∗ . Let ν be an active-minimum matching in
D0 that leaves j1 unmatched.
Claim 1 is true, because otherwise the demand set of every Bi∗ -player except possibly one (say
player k) in D0 would be in Si∗ , implying (Bi∗ − k, Si∗ ) is a bipartite submarket in (D0 , A0 ) (since Si∗
is matchable into Bi∗ − k in D and so in D0 ), and contradicting the fact that ν is active-minimum
by Lemma 6(i) in D0 .
We prove Claim 2 in two steps :
Step (i) µ is active-minimum in (D0 , A0 ) : Otherwise, since µ is active-minimum in (D, A) and
b1 b2 is the only demand in D0 −D, any matching that is active-minimum in (D0 , A0 ) would necessarily
contain b1 b2 . But consider the active-minimum matching ν constructed above and let νSi∗ , µSi∗ be
the restriction of ν, µ respectively to the pairs that have a player in Si∗ . Note that the matching
(ν − (νSi∗ ∪ b1 b2 )) ∪ µSi∗ is active-minimum (because νSi∗ ∪ b1 b2 and µSi∗ have equal cardinality and
contain an equal number of active players) but does not contain b1 b2 . Contradiction.
Step (ii) µ = µ0 and Z 0 = Z − i : A0 = A since D =
6 D0 . Then, any µ-cycle in D is also a µ-cycle
in D0 because D ⊂ D0 . Therefore, Z contains the solitary set at µ in (D0 , A0 ). By Lemma 4, i is
nonsolitary at µ in (D0 , A0 ) since i is nonsolitary at µ0 in (D0 , A0 ). Therefore there is a µ-cycle C
in D0 from i. Note that b1 b2 ∈ C (otherwise C is in D and so i ∈
/ Z). Take any i0 ∈ Z − i and
let C 0 be any µ-sequence from i0 in D0 . Then, b1 b2 ∈
/ C 0 (since C ∩ C 0 = ∅ by the fact that µ is
0

active-minimum in (D0 , A0 )) and so C 0 is in D. Then, C 0 is cycle-free (otherwise µi -market is not
bipartite by Lemma 3 in (D, A) and so i0 ∈
/ Z by Lemma 5). Then, Z − i is the solitary set at µ
in (D0 , A0 ) and by Corollary 3 µ is solitary-minimum in (D0 , A0 ). So, µ0 = µ (recall SMMR) and
Z 0 = Z − i.
Case 1 : b1 ∈ Z, b2 ∈ (B ∗ − Z),
Case 2 : b1 , b2 ∈ (B ∗ − Z).
Note that, in Case 2, both b1 , b2 are matched in µ and there exists a player
b3 ∈ Z
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such that b1 and b2 are both µ0 -reachable in D0 from only b3 in Z. Now we are able to state the two
cases:
Case 1) If i is b1 or b2 , say b1 . Then, Z 0 = Z − b1 .
Case 2) Otherwise, say i is b3 . Then, Z 0 = Z − b3 .
Thus the Seller-Market Algorithm finds a solitary-minimum matching µ0 and the set of solitary
players Z(µ0 ) in (D0 , A0 ) given a solitary-minimum matching µ and the set of solitary players Z(µ)
in (D, A).
Remark 11 It remains to specify a solitary-minimum matching µ00 and the solitary-player set Z(µ00 )
in (D00 , A00 ). This is routine : Let d be the Seller-Market preserving direction selected by the Direction
+
old
Procedure at u, ν new be any matching that matches S ∗0 into B ∗0 in DB
= {ij ∈ µ0 |i ∈
∗0 (d) and ν

B ∗0 }. Define
µ00 = (µ0 ∪ ν new ) − ν old and Z(µ00 ) = B ∗0 − ν new (S ∗0 ).
In particular, (D0 , A0 ), (D00 , A00 ) have the same Seller-Market and |Z(µ00 )| = |Z(µ0 )|.
This completes the description of how solitary-minimum matchings and solitary player sets therefore the Seller-Markets - can be generated recursively along the Procedure Path.

D.1

Proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 4

Lemma 15 (i) Z 0 ⊂ Z. (ii) If Z 0 = Z then (B ∗ , S ∗ ) ⊂ (B ∗0 , S ∗0 ). (iii) If Z 0 = Z and S ∗0 = S ∗
then (B ∗0 , S ∗0 ) = (B ∗ , S ∗ ).
Proof. (i) Z 0 ⊂ Z by Lemma 14.
(ii) Suppose Z 0 = Z and (B ∗ , S ∗ )

(B ∗0 , S ∗0 ). Let B = B ∗ − B ∗0 and S = S ∗ − S ∗0 .

The demand set of every B ∗0 -player in D is in S ∗0 since D ⊂ D0 . The set B cannot be empty,
because otherwise the demand set of every B ∗ -player in D is in S ∗0 , implying S ∗ ⊂ S ∗0 and contradicting with (B ∗ , S ∗ )

(B ∗0 , S ∗0 ).

No player in B ∗ − B demands an S-player in D0 and so in D since D ⊂ D0 . Therefore, µ matches
S into B since µ(S ∗ ) ⊂ B ∗ and in particular |S| ≤ |B| . If |S| = |B|, then µ matches S to B and
S ∗ −S into B ∗ −B. Then, Z ⊂ B ∗ −B and so any µ-market from any player in Z is in (B ∗ −B, S ∗ −S)
since the demand set of each player in B ∗ − B in D is in S ∗ − S and µ(S ∗ − S) ⊂ B ∗ − B. By
Theorem 5 B is empty. Contradiction. Thus, |S| < |B| .
Using Z 0 = Z, it must be that |B ∗0 | − |S ∗0 | = |B ∗ | − |S ∗ |. Then, |S ∗0 − S ∗ | < |B ∗0 − B ∗ | since
|S| < |B|. The demand set of each player in B ∗0 − B ∗ in D0 is in S ∗0 . By using D ⊂ D0 , the demand
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set of each player in B ∗0 − B ∗ in D is in S ∗0 . Then by using the fact that µ matches S ∗ into B ∗ ,
there is a player i ∈ B ∗0 − B ∗ unmatched at µ since |S ∗0 − S ∗ | < |B ∗0 − B ∗ |. Player i is in A since
A0 ⊂ A. By Theorem 5 player i is in a unitary seller-market in (D0 , A0 ) and then in a seller-market
in (D, A) by Lemma 13. Therefore i ∈ Z by Lemma 6(ii). By Theorem 5, i ∈ B ∗ . Contradiction.
(iii ) If Z 0 = Z and S ∗0 = S ∗ , then |B ∗ | − |S ∗ | = |Z| = |Z 0 | = |B ∗0 | − |S ∗0 |. Then, B ∗ = B ∗0 since
|S ∗ | = |S ∗0 | and B ∗ ⊂ B ∗0 .
PROOF OF LEMMA 2 : By Corollary 1 and Lemma 15(i), the Seller-Market excess in (D0 , A0 )
is not greater than the Seller-Market excess in (D, A). By Remark 11, the same is true for
(D00 , A00 ), (D0 , A0 ). By succession, at = |Bt | − |St | ≥ |Bt+1 | − |St+1 | = at+1 on the Procedure
path. This gives the first assertion in Lemma 2. The remaining two assertions follow, similarly,
from Corollary 1, Lemma 15(ii) and (iii) respectively, and Remark 11. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4 : Clearly (at ) is bounded below and (bt ) bounded above. Therefore
Theorem 4 would fail to hold only if there is a T such that at = at+1 and bt = bt+1 for all t ≥ T .
In that case, the Seller-Market remains unaltered while only the direction changes for all t ≥ T.
But by linearity there are only a finite number of directions that can be encountered for all t ≥ T .
0

Therefore it must be that dτ = dτ at two distinct steps τ < τ 0 . However, this is impossible because
then Step τ need not have stopped at uτ +1 . 
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